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The authors use firm-level survey data on 998 small and 
medium enterprises registered for tax in South Africa 
regarding tax compliance costs to investigate the use of 
outsourcing to complete tax compliance tasks. Overall, 
about 43 percent of the enterprises do all their tax 
compliance work in-house, 11 percent outsource all their 
tax compliance work, and the remaining 46 percent use a 
combination of both (“partial outsourcing”). 
   The data display an inverted-U shape for outsourcing 
of tax compliance tasks: the smallest firms (those under 
R 300,000 turnover or well under US$50,000) tend not 
to outsource, due to a combination of relatively higher 
cost-burden and less complexity. Relatively larger firms 
This paper—a product of the Regulatory Simplification Division, Investment Climate Department—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to support business tax reform, improve the efficiency of business tax administration and reduce 
tax compliance costs for businesses. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at gkisunko@worldbank.org.
(those with more than R 14 million turnover or about 
US$2 million) report that they have sufficient in-house 
capacity and therefore do not need to outsource. Those 
in the middle are most likely to outsource at least some 
of their tax compliance work, mostly because tax is 
a specialist field and they presumably lack sufficient 
capacity in-house. The survey data show that the costs 
of tax compliance are clearly the highest for those who 
engage in partial outsourcing, as it appears there is likely 
duplication of effort. Most such firms could reduce 
their tax compliance costs (and probably minimize the 
incidence of post-filing problems) by moving from partial 
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Background and motivation: At the request of the National Treasury of South Africa 
(NT) and the South Africa Revenue Service (SARS) in 2006, the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS, a multi-donor facility of the World Bank Group) initiated a set 
of surveys to measure the tax compliance burden for SMMEs.
2 NT and SARS have been 
developing tax policy and tax administration reforms, including a concerted effort to 
reduce the tax compliance burden on SMMEs. For purposes of this study, and in line with 
current tax legislation in South Africa, SMMEs are defined as those with an annual 
turnover under R 14 million.
3 
 
International research in both developed and developing countries has documented a 
consistent pattern of regressivity in tax compliance costs, such that the smallest firms 
typically face tax compliance costs that are a significantly higher proportion of their 
annual turnover than larger firms (see more detail below). Anecdotal evidence in South 
Africa suggested that many of the smallest firms struggle with tax compliance. A number 
of professional tax practitioners, in interviews with FIAS, stated that they had sometimes 
turned away potential micro- or small businesses because they “could not afford the 
fees.” Meanwhile, fear of “making mistakes” on taxes and the perceived risk of heavy 
penalties imposed by SARS (in addition to unwillingness to pay taxes) were said to be 
factors deterring formalization of many informal firms. 
 
To document the extent of the problem in South Africa, FIAS worked with NT and SARS 
to design a set of three surveys: 
 
  A survey of professional tax practitioners (TP) about their SMME clients 
  A survey of SMMEs registered with SARS 
  A survey of informal SMMEs regarding their perceptions of tax compliance costs 
 
There have been two reports based on the TP survey – “Tax Compliance Burden for 
Small Businesses – a Survey of Tax Practitioners”, focused on different turnover bands 
within SMMEs
4, and “Tax Compliance Costs for Small Businesses – Provincial 
Analysis” focused on provincial differences.
5  
 
The first report documented that SMMEs who use tax practitioners to prepare their filings 
for the four key business taxes in South Africa (CIT, provisional tax, VAT and 
employees’ taxes) pay an average of just over R 7,600 per year (about US$1000), with 
                                                 
2 Small Medium and Micro Enterprises 
3 The exchange rate as of August 2008 was R7.7 = US$1 
4 FIAS (2007) “South Africa: Tax Compliance Burden for Small Businesses: A Survey of Tax 
Practitioners,” available at http://www.fias.net 
5 Coolidge, Ilic and Kisunko (2008) “South Africa: Tax Compliance Burden for Small Businesses: 





relatively little difference across turnover bands.
6 It also confirmed that tax compliance 
costs in South Africa, as in most other countries, are regressive and often burdensome for 
the smallest firms. The second report focused on differences in tax compliance costs 
between the nine provinces of South Africa.  
 
The other two surveys listed above were both co-financed by USAID and carried out by 
Citizen Surveys of South Africa.
7 The direct survey of SMMEs, based on a representative 
sample of almost 1000 SMMEs registered with SARS (and stratified based on turnover 
quintiles between R70,000 and R14 million in the SARS database for the year 2005), also 
confirmed the regressive pattern of tax compliance costs and broadly confirmed the costs 
of outsourcing. It showed that SMMEs devote in the range of 150 - 260 hours per year on 
general accounting and tax compliance.
 8   
 
This paper utilizes the survey of formal SMMEs, and analyses their reported practices of 
outsourcing tax preparation to professional tax practitioners.  
 
 
Brief overview of the survey 
 
The fieldwork for the Tax Compliance Cost Survey of Formal SMMEs in South Africa 
was completed during the second half of 2007.  Interviews were conducted over the 
phone. This effort has resulted in a nationally representative sample of 998 SMMEs 
registered with the South African Revenue Service (SARS) from all provinces of the 
country, all sectors of the economy and turnover groups from just over 70,000 rand to 14 
million rand of reported turnover in 2005. The latter group proved to be rather upward 
moving, that is why the final sample has about 10% of respondents with turnover over 14 
million rand.  To ensure the maximum accuracy of data analysis a weighting factor was 
also computed ensuring fine tuning of sample characteristics.  
 
Questionnaires were developed through a joint effort of the National Treasury, SARS, 
FIAS, the Public Sector Governance Group of the World Bank, and the contractors. 





This paper is aimed at providing a more detailed analysis of patterns and practices of tax 
compliance outsourcing followed by South African SMMEs.  Specifically, we attempt to 
provide a more detailed analysis about which SMMEs do or do not outsource, what tasks 
are outsourced, why they are outsourced, the extent to which the use of IT may substitute 
                                                 
6 These tax compliance costs were clearly separated by the tax practitioners from the cost for general 
accounting services, which averaged about R12,000 per year for SMMEs who outsourced such work. 
7 USAID (2008), “Formal SMME Tax compliance Survey Report: Prepared for National Treasury Republic 
of South Africa”, available at http://www.fias.net  
8 SMME respondents found it difficult to separate tax compliance from general accounting; those who 




for outsourcing, and the costs of outsourcing compared to in-house tax preparation. We 
also attempt to determine whether outsourcing is associated with a lower incidence of 
“post-filing” problems with SARS (e.g., queries, inspections/audits, appeals, etc.).  
 
We therefore start with an analysis of the relationship between respondents’ 
demographics (legal status, main economic activity, size, etc.) and their outsourcing 
“habits,” followed by a brief analysis of patterns of outsourcing specific tax compliance 
tasks.  We then attempt to model and explain how outsourcing behavior affects overall 
tax compliance cost and finish with an analysis of the relationship between outsourcing 
and post-filing interactions with SARS. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  After this introduction, Part 1 provides a 
summary of international tax compliance cost research for business taxpayers done to-
date and briefly summarizes the research techniques used in the analysis for this paper; 
part 2 describes relations between outsourcing and firm demographics; part 3 presents the 
modeling of the cost of tax compliance; part 4 addresses issues of post-filing; and part 5 
provides conclusions and suggests policy implications.  
 
 





There is a growing body of literature about tax compliance costs for businesses
9 
documenting the problem of regressive tax compliance costs, which can, in turn, 
represent a particular burden for many small businesses. This research took place 
primarily in the UK, US, Australia, and New Zealand (see in particular comprehensive 
literature reviews by Sanford (1989), James (2003), and Evans (2003)) and has since 
expanded to other OECD countries and (more recently) developing and transition 
countries such as Malaysia, India, Croatia, Brazil, and the Czech Republic, which all 
display the same regressive pattern. 
 
Many governments, including UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
Netherlands, have been working to reduce tax compliance costs for small businesses. For 
example, the Government of New Zealand has noted that “reducing tax compliance costs 
can help boost productivity and competitiveness as it would allow more resources to be 
applied to core business activities.” (Government of New Zealand, 2007) 
 
On the other hand, the literature on tax compliance notes that one indirect benefit of tax 
compliance is the discipline imposed on small businesses to prepare and maintain 
accurate financial accounts (e.g., income statement, balance sheet). Sandford noted many 
                                                 
9 The most common used definition for tax compliance costs appears to be one offered by Sandford (1995): 
“Costs incurred by taxpayers in meeting the requirements laid on them by the tax law and the revenue 
authorities … over and above the actual payment of tax; costs which would disappear if the tax was 




of the relevant benefits (particularly improvements in information systems and financial 
control), and these have been further documented by the tax compliance cost literature.  
 
A recent World Bank study concluded that more tax compliance in developing countries 
“is significantly associated with more access to credit,” especially in countries that have a 
relatively larger formal sector. They suggest that “firms’ balance sheets are relatively 




Many SMMES (as noted by Turner, 1998), especially those in developing and transition 
countries, often state that they would not bother with formal accounting if not required to 
do so by tax legislation. If they lack the skills to undertake their own accounting and 
can’t afford to hire the necessary expertise, they can find themselves in a difficult 
situation.  
 
The incidence of “outsourcing” – i.e., hiring external tax advisors to assist with various 
aspects of tax compliance – is noted in several of the tax compliance cost studies. Most 
commonly, it is noted that SMMEs have a relatively high tendency to outsource some or 
all of their tax compliance activities, either because they lack the expertise or because the 
amount of work would be insufficient to warrant hiring a full-time accountant or 
bookkeeper (see more detailed examples below). 
 
A small number of tax compliance cost studies have specifically examined SMMEs’ 
experiences with outsourcing, most of them noting that medium and larger firms are more 
likely to have full time tax expertise in their own payroll and therefore are less likely to 
outsource their tax preparation work and related tax compliance tasks.  
 
A key question is whether the smallest firms (e.g., micro-enterprises), who also appear 
somewhat less likely to outsource, do their tax preparation work in-house because they 
can’t afford to outsource (in which case both they and the tax authorities bear the risks of 
numerous “mistakes”) or because their tax compliance needs are simple enough – and 
their in-house capacity is correspondingly high enough - that they don’t need to 
outsource. 
 
The most relevant such study is probably the Colmar Brunton report for New Zealand 
(2005), “Measuring the tax compliance costs of small and medium-sized businesses – a 
benchmark survey.” This survey concluded that 86 – 87% of “micro” (1 – 5 employees) 
and “small” (6 – 19 employees) outsourced at least some tax related services in the year 
before their survey. Businesses with “nil employees” and “medium” firms (over 20 




The report also examined the combined tax compliance costs of both “internal plus 
external” provision. More interestingly, when asked “Whether a business would still pay 
                                                 
10 Gatti, R. and M. Honorati, (2008) “Informality among Formal Firms: Firm-level, Cross-country Evidence 




their external accountant to do their annual accounts if New Zealand were tax free”, fully 




Reports from other developed countries display similar broad patterns. Erard (1997) 
stated for Canada that “the vast majority of small and medium-sized businesses report 
that they rely on outside professional assistance to comply with their corporate income 
and capital taxes.” At the same time, when asked about the aspects of CIT compliance 
that created most problems for businesses, the most frequently cited problem (cited by 
58.5% of respondents) was “the cost of professional services.” While not legally required 
to use professional tax practitioners (as in the case, eg., in Peru), Erard noted: 
 
Smaller businesses are likely to lack the technical knowledge to properly 
complete an income tax return; may not be familiar with the recent tax changes; 
and would in all probability find it cost-inefficient to attempt to develop this 
expertise in house. Although the availability of outside tax assistance undoubtedly 
reduces the overall compliance burden for these firms, the high cost of this 




Similarly, Turner commented that “necessity forces the self-employed tradesman, farmer, 
shopkeeper, or consultant to engage an accountant, even though the cost of employing 
such professionals is often regarded as outrageous.”
12 
 
Patterns of outsourcing differ somewhat in developing and transition countries. In 
Malaysia, “72 percent of public listed companies rely on the use of paid external advisors 
… In contrast, 75% of SMEs seem to rely on their internal resources to comply with the 
tax laws. The findings need to be treated cautiously because both studies were carried out 
prior to the introduction of the self-assessment system.” (Pope and Abdul-Jabbar, 2008) 
Similarly, in Yemen, which has not yet enacted “self-assessment” in tax filing except for 
“large taxpayers,” barely 5% of businesses registered with the tax authorities use any 
external help.
 (FIAS, forthcoming)  
 
In some East European countries, with relatively complex tax systems, it is normal for 
companies (i.e., legal entities) of all sizes to have a full time bookkeeper or accountant on 
the payroll. In a recent survey in Ukraine, over 90% of companies had at least a part-time 
bookkeeper on the payroll and less than 4% of firms outsource any of their tax 
compliance work.(FIAS, forthcoming) In the Czech Republic, in a survey of tax 
compliance costs for businesses, 90% of respondents hired “an external supplier of 
services” for tax duties.
 (Vitek, 2004) 
 
The question for South Africa is whether it might be beneficial to encourage more 
outsourcing by SMMEs. The survey results described below shed useful light on this 
question. 
                                                 
11 Colmar Brunton (2005), pg. 89. 




Analytical methods used 
 
This paper is utilizing several relatively simple and straight-forward statistical methods. 
 
1.  T-tests for independent samples were used when analyses of continuous data were 
performed. T-test scores are quoted together with significance levels.  
 
2.  Chi-tests were used when analyses of categorical data had to be performed. Chi-test 
results are also quoted together with their significance levels. Chi-tests were 
performed only in cases when visual inspection of cross tabulation confirmed that the 
potential statistical significance could be interpreted, e.g. when the causality is clear 
and unambiguous.  
 
3.  Analysis of variance was performed to analyze relations of continuous and 
categorical variables. F-statistics were quoted with their significance levels. In 
addition Scheffe tests were also performed to determine the exact categories between 
which the significant difference exists. 
 
4.  Ordinary Least Square Regression models were used to test whether behavior of 
variables of interest affects the dependent variable (cost of compliance). 
 
 
2.  Outsourcing patterns 
 
It is given that all companies that function as officially registered entities must register 
with the tax authorities and file tax returns on a regular basis.  Tax compliance work can 
be done either entirely in-house, fully outsourced to outside specialists, or be a mixture of 
in-house efforts and fee-for-service outsourcing (referred to in this paper as “partial 
outsourcing”).  The South Africa Survey of Formal SMMEs allows an analysis of these 
differences from various angles.
13  Figure 1 shows that different legal forms of businesses 
have somewhat different approaches to their tax compliance work. The level of 
outsourcing is somewhat higher among sole proprietors and Close Corporations. Analysis 
of variance confirms that Close Corporations and sole proprietors have a significantly 
higher outsourcing index
14 than companies (PTY Ltd, which are usually somewhat larger 







                                                 
13 The full questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. 








Table 1: Analysis of variance: Outsourcing index by the respondents legal status 
 
Analysis of variance  F = 21.65*** 
Scheffe Sole  proprietors  Partnership Company  Close  corporation 
Sole proprietors     MD = 12.215 
St. err. = 5.118 
MD = 13.451 (***) 
St. err. = 3.491 
MD = -7.199 
St. err. = 3.092 
Partnership      MD = 1.236 
St. err. = 4.909 
MD = -19.414 (***) 
St. err. = 4.634 
Company        MD = -20.650 (***) 
St. err. = 2.733 













































Apparently, businesses tend to use less outside help when they grow larger.  Figure 2 
shows that the propensity to outsource tax compliance activities drops as the turnover 
rises. Businesses in the lowest turnover band have an outsourcing index as high as 44 and 
it drops to 25 for businesses with turnover higher than 14 million rand. A correlation 
between turnover and the outsourcing index proves the significance of this relation 
(Pearson coefficient is -0.210 and significant at 1% level). 
 
 




















































The relationship between employment in a business and outsourcing practice is almost 
monotonic: Figure 3 below shows that the larger the number of employed people 
(including part-timers and family members) the more likely tax compliance work will be 
done fully in-house and the less likely it will be fully outsourced.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between number of employees and the outsourcing index is 





























































An analysis of outsourcing habits by economic activity shows similar patterns of using 
outside help with tax compliance work for most sectors, except the “finance, real estate 
and business services” sector (Figure 4). The latter sector uses outside help significantly 
less frequently than respondents whose main activities are in other sectors of economy (F 





































Wholesale and retail trade
























Figure 5 shows that businesses registered for e-filing seem to use outside help in order to 
comply with taxes significantly less than those not registered for e-filing (t = -5.264, 
significant at 1% level
15). Also, businesses who do not always use computers and 
specialized software tend to outsource tax compliance work more frequently (t = -3.765, 
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15 Significance of difference between groups was tested using the outsourcing index as a measure of 




According to respondents overall, the main reason for not using outside help for tax 
compliance work is not the cost of these services. Figure 6 shows that only 10% of 
respondents suggested that the cost of tax practitioners is the main reason for not hiring 
them, while 80% report that they have sufficient in-house tax expertise. Conversely, 78% 
of those respondents who outsource report they do it because “tax is a specialist field.” 
 
Figure 6: Why outsourcing is or is not used 
9
Reasons for the decision …
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to outsource or not to outsource
 
 
As expected, a larger proportion of the smallest firms who do not outsource reported that 
the reason was the high cost of outsourcing.” (See Figure 7.) 
 






The frequency of using outside expertise for tax compliance work differs substantially by 
the type of tax compliance activity.  Figure 8 shows that the lowest usage of outside help 
is for general bookkeeping, and preparation and submission of SDL, PAYE and VAT 
returns. These are tasks that are more frequent within a tax year, so perhaps they are done 
routinely and learned well by employees of reporting businesses. 
 
The highest usage of the outside help is for less frequent (and perhaps more complex) tax 
compliance tasks such as preparing, filling and submitting provisional and income tax 
returns, preparing and lodging appeals and preparing annual statements.  It is interesting 
to note that while full outsourcing of specific tax compliance tasks fluctuates greatly 
among various types of tax compliance-related activities (from 15% of respondents fully 
outsourcing general record keeping to 38% outsourcing filling out provisional company 
tax returns), partial outsourcing within specific tax compliance tasks remains practically 
the same (fluctuates from 9% to 13% of activities). 
 




















































Compiling necessary documentation/information for SDL
General keeping of books and record keeping
Filling out SDL returns
Compiling necessary documentation/information for VAT
Filling out PAYE returns
Compiling necessary documentation/information for PAYE
Filling out VAT returns
Obtaining refunds from SARS
Representing the company during SARS inspections/audits
Tax clearance certificate applications
Personal Income Tax
Process of wavering of penalties and interest on late submissions
or payments
Representing the company in appeals to SARS
Compilation of company annual financial statements
Compiling necessary documentation for Provisional and Company
Income Tax
Lodging of appeal if you disagreed with a tax assessment
Filling out Provisional and Company Tax returns
Outsource Mixed In house
 
 
Further analysis of partial outsourcing shows that it is practiced for all kinds of tax 
activities, and there seems to be no special determinant of who will choose to partially 
outsource. The only interesting and significant finding shows that partial outsourcing is 
significantly more frequent among companies experiencing any kind of problem 




as a result of late payments).  A more rigorous analysis of this phenomenon is not 
possible due to the low number of relevant survey responses who reported such 
experiences.  Nevertheless, were possible we tried to provide few illustrations of 
SMMEs’ post-filing experiences in part four of this paper. 
 
3.  Modeling the costs of outsourcing  
 
Tax compliance is a time-consuming and costly endeavor.  A number of South African 
SMMEs complained that it suppresses their growth.  The results of the Formal SMMEs 
Tax Compliance Cost Survey provided a rich database that allows for analysis of the 
incidence and cost of tax compliance in South Africa. 
 
In order to understand what drives the cost of tax compliance we formulated a base 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1:  Outsourcing of tax compliance work to tax professionals saves money. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis in several settings we created an estimate of total 
compliance cost (see Annex 1 for details), indexes of outsourcing of tax compliance work 
(see Annex 2 for details) and a number of dummy variables. 
 
To test the hypothesis we used the following OLS model: 
 
e d d D D D D O O H Emp Turn C full file e activities taxes legal province part              ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
where: 
 
ln(C) – ln total cost of tax compliance, 
ln(Turn) – ln total turnover, 
ln(Emp) – ln of total employment 
H – share of tax compliance work done in house, 
Opart – share of tax compliance work that is partially outsourced, 
O – share of tax activities fully outsourced; 
Dprovince – dummy variables for provinces, 
Dlegal – dummy variables for legal of businesses, 
Dtaxes – dummy variables for taxes paid, 
Dactivities – dummy variables for tax compliance activities undertaken, 
de-file – dummy for businesses using e-filing, 
dfull – dummy for businesses using either only in-house (0) expertise or fully outsourcing 
tax compliance work. 
 
From the beginning we have noticed that while both ln(Turnov) and ln(Empl) variables 
are significant and robust in the regression model, and the former has 266 missing values 
(out of 998 observations in the sample), while the latter has none.  We tested logarithms 
of full-time employment, total employment and turnover as controls for firms’ size and 
came to the conclusion that using logarithm turnover and full-time employment as 




In order to increase number of observations that can be used in the regression model it 
was decided to impute most of missing values for turnover. Turnover volumes for 247 
respondents who refused to provide an exact number for annual turnover were replaced 
with regression-based estimates.  The remaining respondents (19 respondents) answered 
“Do not know” to the turnover question.  These values were not imputed.  Imputed values 
were calculated using a linear regression model that explains 87% of turnover variation 
(see Annex 3 for details). 
 
Table 2 below shows results of multivariate regression models of total cost of tax 
compliance.  The first regression – “Basic” model - shows that the sign of coefficients for 
variables of interest – partial outsourcing and full outsourcing indexes - are positive in the 
basic specification model that contains turnover and employment as additional right-hand 
side variables. The coefficients are significant at the 1% level.   
 
This Basic model was then tested for sensitivity to the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables (as specified in the description above).  The results proved to be robust. 
Eventually we extended the Basic model to what is called “Base” model in Table 2 to 
include other explanatory variables from the above list.  In the Base model, variables of 
interest, i.e. shares of activities partially/completely outsources proved to be significant in 
explaining the dependent variable (Table 2, Base model).  
 
The Basic model (and supporting statistical analysis that is not shown in this paper) 
suggests that there a significant difference in the cost of compliance between those 
businesses doing everything “in house” and those outsourcing at least something. These 
findings show that, since the cost is significantly lower in the group of businesses not 
outsourcing, these two groups are actually two separate subpopulations of businesses and 
more specific analysis is needed to determine the influence of the level of outsourcing on 
the cost of compliance. For this reason the “Restricted” Model was developed to analyze 
only respondents already using at least some outsourcing. 
 
The Base model was therefore restricted to include only businesses that outsource (fully 
or partially) at least one of the seventeen tax compliance activities covered by the 
survey.
16  This was done to separate those respondents who use only “in-house” expertise 
to fulfill tax compliance requirements and those who look outside for help and or 
expertise for at least some of their tax compliance tasks (Table 2, Restricted model).  
 
Finally, based on the testing of the Base and Restricted models, we excluded from the 
analysis those companies that used outside help for some (but not all) of their tax 
compliance activities, thus we created a “Polarized” model that would analyze only the 
tax compliance cost for companies that either have done all their tax compliance work in-
house or fully outsourced it to an external consultant (Table 2, Polarized model). 
 
It is also important to note that the three outsourcing indexes (H, Opartial, and O) add up to 
1 and, thus, cannot appear together in the same model, that the e-filing dummy variable is 
                                                 





not significant and thus is not used in the regressions, and that in the “restricted” model 
regression the Western Cape Province dummy loses its significance.  This dummy 
remains insignificant in the polarized model; several other variables also became 
insignificant in the latter model, i.e. VAT dummy and dummies for legal form are losing 
significance.  We did not use these dummies in the polarized model mostly because their 
presence reduces the significance of our target variable - the full outsourcing dummy. 
 
The Basic and Base models show that while it is cheaper to complete tax compliance 
work in-house (i.e. positive coefficients for both partial and full outsourcing indexes), it 
is, indeed, more expensive to have various tax compliance activities being partially 
outsourced rather than do full outsourcing of each of these activities.  To an extent it may 
be seen as paying twice – first for in-house work and then for outside consultants/tax 
practitioners.   
 
Table 2. OLS results 





















































Dummy for full in-house (0)/full outsourcing(1) 
    -0.186* 
(0.106) 













































Adj.  R2  0.256 0.294 0.448 0.276 
N  911 911 490 521 
Mean  of  the  dependent  variable  9.700 9.700 9.864 9.421 





Another way of looking at the influence of partial outsourcing on the overall cost of tax 
compliance is to look at it by different turnover groups.  Figure 9 shows the results of the 
analysis by turnover groups.  
 
Figure 9:  Cost of outsourcing by turnover group (rand) 






















Cost of tax compliance - thousands of Rands




It can be seen that cost of compliance is higher if partial outsourcing is practiced 
(compared to firms who either use full outsourcing or do everything fully in-house). This 
trend exists in all turnover groups.  Table 3 shows that these differences are statistically 
significant for most of the turnover groups (for all groups but 300 thousand - 1 million 
the difference is statistically significant on at least 5% level). 
 
 
Table 3: T-test of mean difference: partial outsourcing by turnover group
17 
 
Turnover group  N  T-test value 
Less than 300 thousand  173 -4.445*** 
300 thousand – 1 million  166 -1.154
18 
1 – 6 million  297 -2.763*** 
6 – 14 million  106 -2.173** 
Over 14 million  90 -2.079** 
All turnover groups  927 -4.426*** 
** Significance at 5% level     
*** Significance at 1% level     
                                                 
17 The difference was tested on the total cost of compliance comparing means of respondents using partial 
outsourcing and those not practicing it 
18 Although the difference is not significant for this group, if the group is split into subgroups by using 





The Restricted model includes only businesses that have outsourced at least some of their 
tax compliance activities, thus, have already engaged in the outsourcing.  The results 
show that while increasing the share of outsourcing (either partial or full) would save 
business some money, the saving from full outsourcing is substantially higher.  
 
It is also worth noting that the Restricted model increases the level of variation explained 
by the regression, while the Western Cape provincial dummy has lost significance and 
the regression coefficient flipped its sign to positive.   
 
Figure 10 presents the results of the Restricted model graphically.  This chart is based on 
values estimated based on results of testing the Restricted model.  On average, for firms 
that have already started outsourcing some of their tax compliance work, 29.4% of 
activities are still completed in-house, 22.3% are partially outsourced, and 48.3% are 
fully outsourced.  If the remaining work done in-house would be done using outside help, 
i.e. partially outsourced, then estimated cost would be reduced by about 6%; if it is fully 
outsourced, the cost could be reduced by 22%.  It is important to keep in mind that these 
estimates are true for only those firms that are already outsourcing at least some of their 
tax compliance work. 
 
Figure 10: Estimated cost of tax compliance for firms that are already outsourcing  
 
 
The Polarized model (i.e., excluding any partial outsourcing of activities) shows that on 
average, businesses that fully outsource tax compliance work have lower tax compliance 
cost than businesses that do all their tax compliance work in-house.   
 
Figure 11 show that for every turnover group in the SMME sector, i.e. businesses with 
turnover under R14 million, full outsourcing of tax compliance work proves to be 



























































The overall conclusion from the Restricted and Polarized models is as follows.  If a firm 
can do all tax compliance work in-house (mostly larger firms who can afford a full-time, 
qualified accountant and small firms without VAT or significant payroll taxes) it should 
continue doing so.  If a firm has started to outsource (e.g., because it has grown larger 
and more complicated in terms of tax compliance), it is better to go all the way and fully 
outsource as much of tax the compliance work as it can.  
 
 




Based on the regression results discussed in this section we can not reject Hypothesis 1, 
i.e. it is unlikely that outsourcing of tax compliance work is more expensive than doing 
this work in-house for the majority of SMMEs in South Africa. 
 
In order to strengthen the above conclusion, we also tested the sensitivity of our model to 
changes in “prices” of internal accounting services (i.e., salaries for in-house staff 
carrying out tax compliance work). Estimates of the total tax compliance cost used 
certain levels of gross monthly salaries for internal accountants (see Annex 1 for details).  
In order to test how sensitive our results are to changes in such costs, we adjusted prices 
up and down to 150% and 50% of the levels used for estimates of the above. 
 
The results are summarized in the Table 4 below.  The full set of results is given in 
Annex 5.  Table 4 shows that for Basic, Base and Restricted models, lower salaries for 
in-house accountants (- 10%, -20%, etc.) do not change the fact that complete 
outsourcing of tax compliance work is cheaper than it partial outsourcing, though for 















Table 4: Sensitivity analysis (coefficient and significance) 
 
*, **, *** Significance 
level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively 
  50%  40% 30%  20% 10%  0%  -10% -20% -30%  -40%  -50% 




-0.175 -0.120  -0.061  0.004 0.075  0.154  0.242 0.342 0.457  0.592  0.755 
significance  **       *  *** *** ***  ***  *** 
Share partially 
outsourced 
0.551  0.578 0.608  0.641 0.679  0.721  0.770 0.827 0.895  0.977  1.080 
significance  ***  *** ***  *** ***  ***  *** *** ***  ***  *** 




-0.136 -0.081  -0.021  0.045 0.117  0.196  0.285 0.386 0.502  0.637  0.801 
significance  ~*        **  *** *** ***  ***  *** 
Share partially 
outsourced 
0.510  0.537 0.567  0.600 0.638  0.681  0.730 0.787 0.855  0.937  1.040 
significance  ***  *** ***  *** ***  ***  *** *** ***  ***  *** 




-1.133 -1.084  -1.032  -
0.977 
-0.918  -0.855  -0.787 -
0.714 
-0.634 -0.546  -0.447 
significance  ***  *** ***  *** ***  ***  *** *** ***  ***  *** 
Share partially 
outsourced 
-0.344 -0.323  -0.300  -
0.276 
-0.250  -0.222  -0.192 -
0.159 
-0.123 -0.082  -0.036 
significance  *** ** **  ** **  *         
Polarized                    
Dummy: full 
in-house (0) 
-0.571 -0.506  -0.436  -
0.360 
-0.277  -0.186  -0.086  0.027 0.154 0.302  0.477 






When the salaries of in-house accountants increase (+10%, +20%, etc.) the benefits of 
full outsourcing become even more pronounced.   For example, in the case of the Basic 
model, if the cost of internal accountants would go up by about 21% it would become 
cheaper to completely outsource tax compliance work than to have an accountant on 
payroll, i.e. coefficient for the share of complete outsourcing variable becomes negative 
(though this variable would be insignificant in the model until the cost would go up by 
50%).  In the case of the Base model, the pattern is about the same – when the in-house 
cost goes up by about 27%, the coefficient for the complete outsourcing variable changes 
its sign.  In the case of the restricted model, higher salaries for in-house accountants do 
not change the fact that complete outsourcing of tax compliance work is cheaper than 
partial outsourcing, and both types of outsourcing are cheaper than doing tax compliance 
work fully in house, though for obvious reasons the relative difference between full and 
partial outsourcing is getting smaller.  
 
In the case of the polarized model, an increase in the cost of in-house accountants makes 
full outsourcing more and more attractive compared to doing tax compliance work fully 
in-house.  At the same time, a reduction of the cost of in-house accounting by about 17% 
would make it cheaper to do all tax compliance work in-house than to outsource it 
completely (and when the in-house cost goes down by about 35%, the relevant dummy 
variable again becomes significant in the polarized regression model). 
 
 
4. Use of outsourcing at the post-filing stage of tax compliance 
procedures 
 
A related set of questions about outsourcing of tax compliance work concerns post-filing 
issues such as queries from SARS, disagreement over assessments, inspections, and 
appeals. Since only about 6% of respondents reported any such experiences, the data 
were insufficient for rigorous testing of hypotheses. Nevertheless, analysis of the 
available data was suggestive. 
 
When it comes to disagreeing with SARS assessments, it seems that outsourcing has no 
significant influence on a business whether to disagree with an assessment or not.  
 
Analysis of queries, inspections and audits and their relation to outsourcing reveals that 
business having queries have a significantly higher outsourcing index
19 (31% and 24%, 
respectively) than firms not having queries and similarly for inspections and audits
20 
(32% and 25%, respectively).  
 
One possible explanation for this is that some businesses have overall more complex tax 
accounting leading to both higher level of outsourcing and more frequent SARS 
                                                 
19 t = 2.039, significant at 5% level. 




inspections and queries. The other explanation is related to direction of causality. It is 
possible that more frequent inspections, audits and queries actually stimulate the higher 
level of outsourcing.   
 
Partial outsourcing may not be the result of any plan, but often instead results when a 
firm planning on doing everything in-house encounters unforeseen problems they can't 
handle.  Available data do not allow us to test whether such a firm would have been 
better off fully outsourcing from the beginning or acquiring more in-house expertise from 
the beginning, but it's definitely easier to outsource on a short notice than to acquire an 
in-house expertise.  
 
And finally, perhaps firms were taking a calculated risk.  Many more may have taken the 
same risk and not encountered any unforeseen problems.  In short, the survey results look 
at partial outsourcing ex post, thus partial outsourcing may look suboptimal, because 
firms that partially outsource disproportionately include firms encountering unforeseen 
problems.  But a priori, it may have been optimal to plan on relying on in-house expertise 
but taking a risk that outsourcing might be necessary if a problem arose.  The in-house 
sample includes the firms who took that risk and lucked out, so their costs ex post are 
lower.  Unfortunately, in order to properly test the latter hypothesis one would need to 
randomly assign a large number of new firms to three groups (full outsourcing, partial 
outsourcing and in-house accounting) and run a long-term experimental study.  
 
It is also possible that both explanations have their role in this phenomenon. 
 
A similar effect is observed in the case of penalties and interests imposed as a result of 
late CIT and provisional tax submissions. Penalties and interest are more frequently
21 
imposed on businesses that outsource income and provisional tax compliance tasks 
(business who outsource these tasks are about 30% more likely to have these sanctions 
imposed than business that do not outsource these tasks).   
 
Reverse causality may again be the most plausible explanation of this phenomenon - not 
that outsourcing causes lower or higher incidence of late submissions, but the incidence 
of these late submissions may lead to higher levels of outsourcing (although analyses of 
similar relations for VAT and PAYE/ UIF/ SDL have not shown the same tendency).
22 
 
Another finding speaking in favor of reversed causality is connected to the relationship 
between e-filing and problems with SARS. It seems that businesses registered for e-filing 
tend to have problems with SARS more frequently.
23  The interpretation of this finding 
might be that businesses having problems with SARS are more likely to register for e-
filing in an attempt to avoid or mitigate post filing problems (e.g., because it would 
remove one step which could allow for introduction of errors). Since the data suggests 
that e-filing and outsourcing are roughly substitutes for one another, it might also be 
                                                 
21 Chi square = 3.268, significant at about 8% level. 
22 Some anecdotes from TPs suggest that some clients are slow in delivering documentation, leaving little 
time for the TPs, especially those with a large client base to meet all SARS deadlines.  




possible that those who don’t use e-filing are more likely to outsource and are less likely 
to make mistakes that would lead to problems with SARS. 
 
Businesses requesting interest and penalties to be waived have a significantly lower 
outsourcing index than those who decided not to do so
24 (26% and 37% percent, 
respectively), i.e. businesses that are heavier users of tax consultant/tax practitioner 
expertise are significantly less likely to submit waiver requests than those who are relying 
more on in-house tax expertise
25. Businesses that do not outsource are 60% more likely 
to submit such a request. 
 
An explanation for these results is similar to those suggested above for lodging an 
assessment appeal: it is either that for businesses outsourcing this activity, a request for 
waiver represents a direct monetary cost and they may be more reluctant to undertake it; 
or that a tax practitioner is more knowledgeable and thus knows when such a request 
would not have a positive result. Another possibility is that SARS may be more likely to 
accept tax returns prepared by professional TPs. 
 
The number of observations for analysis of success of requests to have penalties and 
interest waived is too low for reliable analysis, however the ratio of success for requests 
handled by outsourced practitioners is approximately 2:3 (13 successes out of 19 attempts 
or success ratio of 0.68) and if handled by in house staff, the success ratio is 
approximately 7:8 (22 successes out of 25 attempts or success ratio of 0.88). A possible 
explanation of this finding is that tax practitioners are being hired in “more problematic” 
situations when chances of success are lower, thus their illusive lower efficiency. 
 
When it comes to lodging an appeal to income and provisional tax assessments, the 
results show that the ratio of businesses outsourcing income and provisional tax tasks is 
lower among businesses deciding to lodge an appeal than it is in overall population. In 
other words businesses preparing income and provisional taxes “in house” are 
significantly
26 more likely to lodge an appeal than those outsourcing these tasks (2.6 
times more likely, to be precise, though the overall share of business that lodged an 
appeal among all respondents is only about 4.5%). 
 
There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon: one is that if this task is 
outsourced, lodging an appeal presents direct monetary cost (i.e., for the assistance of the 
TP) which some businesses might be reluctant to accept. Another explanation might be 
that tax practitioners have better knowledge about whether lodging an appeal is justified 
and they undertake this action less frequently knowing it would not yield positive results. 
 
The last, but not least observation regarding the post-filing aspects of tax compliance is 
shown in Figure 12 below.  It is clear that respondents who outsourced all their tax 
compliance work have the fewest problems with SARS: none to be precise.  This finding 
supports a finding described earlier in this paper – partial outsourcing of tax compliance 
                                                 
24 t = 2.281, significant at 5% level. 
25 Chi square = 6.709, significant at 5% level. 




work is the costliest solution – both in terms of monetary cost and potential problems 
with SARS. 
 








The SMME survey clearly showed TPs are an important resource for SMMEs, with 57% 
of respondents reporting at least some outsourcing of tax compliance work. While many 
of the larger SMMEs say they have the necessary tax expertise on their staff, smaller 
firms often find it more cost-effective to outsource tax preparation and related activities 
on a fee-for-service basis, although some respondents claimed they could not afford it.  
 
The decision whether or not to outsource in South Africa is dominated by the availability 
of the necessary expertise. Almost three quarters of SMMEs who outsource say they do it 
because “tax is a specialized field” and they presumably lack such specialized skills 
among their own staff. Conversely, for those giving reasons for not outsourcing, 80% 
reported that they “have sufficient in-house expertise.” 
 
However, ten percent of SMMEs who were not outsourcing tax-related tasks said the 
reason was that “it costs too much to outsource.” As expected, these responses were 
mostly to be found among the lowest turnover bands: 24% of firms with a turnover under 















































Looking at SMMEs by size, the outsourcing index is highest for firms with the lowest 
turnover, and it falls steadily as turnover increases. For all but the largest SMMEs, the 
largest category is “partial outsourcing” followed by “in house only.” The pattern is even 
more pronounced gauging firm size by the number of employees. While only 45% of 
firms with over 100 employees engage in any outsourcing, 67% of firms with three or 
fewer employees outsource at least some of their tax work, and a majority of them use a 
mix of outsourcing and in-house resources. 
 
The survey asked about outsourcing of 17 different tax-related activities, from filling out 
basic tax returns for key taxes to lodging appeals against SARS assessments. As 
expected, the most routine tasks are most likely to be undertaken in-house, e.g., general 
bookkeeping and preparing regular tax returns for VAT and payroll taxes, for which two-
thirds of firms report using in-house resources exclusively.  Tasks that are less routine 
and more complicated are more likely to be outsourced.  Reliance on in-house resources 
drops to 50 – 55% of firms for compilation of annual financial statements, CIT and 
provisional tax, (as well as filing appeals with SARS).   
 
It is also worth noting that for any individual activity, only a small minority (9 – 13%) of 
SMMEs report “partial outsourcing” (i.e., a mix of in-house and outsourcing). 
 
A closer examination of SMMEs who “partially outsource” some or all of their tax work 
(i.e., those who report some outsourcing and some in-house work for their accounting 
and/or tax compliance tasks) shows that this approach to tax compliance is both quite 
common in South Africa (46% of all SMMEs, the largest single category) and apparently 
the most expensive. 
 
If we compare SMMEs who outsource fully (11% of SMMEs) with those who utilize 
only in-house resources (43% of SMMEs), we see that the largest firms (those over R14 
million turnover) find in-house work slightly less expensive than outsourcing. For the 
smallest firms (those under R300,000 annual turnover, who are less likely to be registered 
for VAT and probably have smaller/simpler payroll), the cost of in-house vs. outsourcing 
is almost the same. However, for most SMMEs between R300,000 and R 14 million, full 
outsourcing appears to be significantly cheaper than full in-house work.  
 
Further, when we compare “full outsourcing” with “partial outsourcing” (among firms 
who do any outsourcing at all), we see that full outsourcing would be much more cost-
effective for them. For firms that do any outsourcing, the status quo is (on average) over 
R19,000 per year. If they fully outsourced all their activities currently done fully in-
house, this figure could be reduced to just over R15,000 per year. Sensitivity analysis on 
costs of in-house tax compliance work shows the signs of the coefficients are robust. 
 
Thus the survey data suggest that “partial outsourcing” appears to involve a substantial 
amount of duplicated work. On the basis of interviews with FIAS, several TPs have 
described many SMME clients who provide them with their bookkeeping and perhaps 
some initial effort at preparing tax documents. However, before the tax returns (or similar 




the work done by their client and often go back and correct errors (due to 
misunderstandings about SARS regulations, calculation errors, etc.). Thus work is carried 
out twice – once by the SMME using in-house resources and then re-done (or at least re-
checked, which also takes time) by the TP. In this situation, most SMMEs would have 
been better off outsourcing all the work from the outset to a professional tax practitioner. 
 
However, it is also possible that partial outsourcing may appear more expensive than in-
house tax compliance work “after the fact” if such firms tend to resort to TPs only after 
they have started to encounter problems.  Therefore, the next questions addressed in this 
analysis were differences between SMMEs who outsourced various “post-filing” 
activities and those who did them in-house. As noted above, post-filing tasks are more 
likely to be outsourced than more simple and routine tax returns. However, these tasks 
are themselves relatively rare, with only about 6% of SMMEs reporting any experience 
with them in the survey. In general, the incidence of post-filing issues is positively 
associated with outsourcing (except that firms that fully outsource everything reported no 
post-filing issues at all).  
 
With regard to late submissions and related penalties/interest, TPs interviewed by FIAS 
noted that many clients wait until the last minute to bring their accounts and 
documentation to their TP, who are then overwhelmed and unable to complete all the 
work by the statutory deadlines.  
 
With regard to other “post-filing issues”, one possibility is that SMMEs are more likely 
to hire an outside TP when their business activities are relatively more complicated 
and/or when they have started to encounter problems. In this view, the causality runs 
from “complications” to “hire a TP”. If so, the best approach would be to encourage 
businesses to bring in the necessary expertise sooner rather than later – better to avoid 
and prepare for possible problems than try to fix them after they have occurred. 
 
Another possible interpretation of the positive relationship between outsourcing and post-
filing issues, however, is that there may be a number of poorly-qualified TPs serving 
SMMEs, including TPs who may have been certified in the past but fail to keep up with 





The data on SMEs in South Africa display an inverted “U” shape for outsourcing of tax 
compliance tasks: the smallest firms – (those under R 300,000 turnover or well under 
US$50,000) tend not to outsource, due to a combination of relatively higher cost-burden 
and less complexity (e.g., less likelihood to be registered for VAT, smaller/simpler 
payroll), while relatively larger firms (e.g., those with over R14 million turnover or about 
US$ 2 million) report they have sufficient in-house capacity and therefore no need to 
outsource. Those in the middle are most likely to outsource at least some of their tax 
compliance work. Further, those who engage in “partial outsourcing” appear to be 




presumably more highly-qualified) assistance is recruited. The external tax practitioner 
must, at a minimum, check the work done in-house and may have to correct errors. Thus, 
it appears that for any firm that has felt the need to resort to outsourcing, it would be 
more cost-effective for them to fully outsource all their tax compliance activities. Those 
who do, also appear to avoid post-filing problems as well. 
 
In the case of South Africa, the NT and SARS have designed a new, optional “turnover 
tax” to replace corporate income tax and provisional tax for firms with a turnover under 
R 1 million (about US$150,000), and are also raising the threshold for mandatory VAT 
registration to R 1 million as of early 2009. This is intended to simplify tax compliance 
for the smallest firms, with the hope they can manage tax compliance without the need to 
hire expensive tax practitioners. However, the survey evidence suggests that many firms 
between R1 - 14 million turnover (as well as those under R 1 million who may feel the 
need to register for VAT, as well as the regular CIT and provisional tax) are currently 
facing unnecessarily high tax compliance costs by employing partial outsourcing, and 
that they would be better off fully outsourcing (at least until it becomes cost-effective for 
them to hire a qualified, full-time accountant). 
 
How to encourage this? 
 
In the case of South Africa, a first step could be to publicize the results of the survey and 
try to ensure that SMMEs are aware first of the need to ensure they (or their staff or their 
tax practitioner) have the requisite skills to carry out the work, and also of the cost 
savings of “full outsourcing” vs. “partial outsourcing.” 
27 
 
It would also be a good idea to try to expand the ranks of qualified TPs in South Africa, 
especially those likely to serve the SMME sector. This could include a combination of 
expansion of “certificate” courses offered by the education system, the relevant 
accounting/bookkeeping Associations, and/or SARS itself. It may be helpful to make a 
distinction between general bookkeeping skills needed by entrepreneurs running small 
businesses and likely to use the new simplified tax regime (i.e., so they may be able to 
handle their tax compliance work in-house without necessarily having to hire a TP) and 
“certificate” courses (at various levels) for bookkeepers and accountants who may need 
to handle the regular CIT, provisional tax, VAT and payroll taxes.  
 
Other options, especially those that may involve subsidies, “tax breaks” or further 
reforms to tax administration or tax policy should probably wait until after the new small 
business tax regime has been enacted and small businesses have had an opportunity to 
learn to work with it. Further monitoring after that may yield more useful information to 
guide future reforms in South Africa. 
                                                 
27 South Africa already allows businesses to deduct the cost of a TP as an expense in the calculation of 





Annex 1:  Calculation of total tax compliance cost 
 
 
Calculation of the total tax compliance cost 
 
1.  Q16a was recoded
28. For all respondents who didn’t provide exact answer and did 
provide a category a middle category point was taken as a value.  
 
2.  One outlier (15 million rand) was taken out of the calculation.  
 
3.  The highest category was replaced with the minimal recorded value of those 
respondents providing exact figure  - 200K rand (the new variable in the database 
is a16a). 
 
4.  Q17a and b were combined and variable was created with sum of all employees 
time shares spent on tax accounting (the new variable in the database is a17ab). 
 
5.  Gross monthly salaries of inside accountants were estimated based on firm 
turnover band. The assumption is that accountants in the larger firms have higher 
salaries. The following estimates were used: 
 
(a) Up to 300 K rand the salary is estimated at 6 000 rand 
(b) 300K – 1 million – 10 000 rand 
(c) 1 – 6 million – 12 000 rand 
(d) More than 6 million – 15 000 rand 
 
6.  For respondents not providing information about their turnover, number of 
employees was taken as a proxy based on the analysis of cross-tabulation between 
number of employees and turnover (the new variable in the database is “salary”): 
(a) 3 or less employees – 6 000 rand 
(b) 4 – 6 employees – 11 000 rand (approximately same share of respondents 
belonged to groups 2 and 3 in above turnover categories) 
(c) 7 – 15 employees – 12 000 rand 
(d) 16 – 30 employees – 12 000 rand 
(e) 31 employees or more – 15 000 rand.  
 
7.  Annual cost of staff was calculated by multiplying monthly gross salary by 12 
(months) and adding 20% for overhead (the new variable in the database is 
“salary2”). 
 
8.  The full salary variable (“salary2”) was multiplied by the value of “sum of 
employees’ time shares spent on tax accounting (variable a17ab in the database) 
                                                 






to get the cost of “in-house” part of tax accounting cost, i.e. accounting work that 
was not outsources (the variable in the database is “inside”). 
 
9.  In-house part was added to the cost of outsourcing (variable a16a) to get the total 
cost of tax compliance (the new variable in the database is “totcost”)
29. 
 




Calculation of compliance cost for specific taxes 
 
11. Cost of processing and submitting income and provisional tax returns on annual 
base was calculated, but only for respondents doing everything “in house” (the 
new variable in the database is “costprovincome”). Parameters used in previous 
calculation were used here as well.  
 
12. Similarly, cost of processing and submitting of the VAT tax forms was estimates 
for respondents who has done everything “in-house (the new variable in the 
database is “costVAT”).   
 
13. The values of the above two variables were caqlculated as follows: number of 
submissions multiplied by the number of hours per submission multiplied by the 
cost of an hour of work.  The latter was calculated from salary cost calculated in 
previous section based on 1840 working hours per year. 
 
                                                 




Annex 2: Calculation of outsourcing indexes 
 
 
Overall outsourcing index  
 
1.  The overall outsourcing index was calculated by assigning scores to values 
registered in various items under question 14.
30  Score 0 was assigned if certain 
activity was completed by employees of the respondent company (in-house), 
score 1 was assigned if activity was completed by both employees and outside 
consultant (partial outsourcing), and score 2 was assigned if the activity was 
completed entirely by outside consultant (full outsourcing). These scores were 
summed up for all 17 activities covered in the question 14 and divided by a 
maximum possible number of points for each respondent (e.g. if a certain 
respondent was involved in 15 out of 17 activities than the maximum number of 
points is 30). The number was multiplied by 100 to achieve results on a scale with 
the minimum of 0 points (for respondents who did everything in-house) and a 
maximum of 100 points (for respondents who completely outsourced all tasks). 
(the new variable in the database is “io100”) 
 
 
Complete outsourcing index 
 
2.  This index actually represents a share of specific activities defined under question 
14 completely outsourced (code 3 in question 14) for each specific respondent. It 
must be noticed that this is a share of all tasks specific respondent was involved 
in, not of all 17 possible tasks (the new variable in the database is indexoutside). 
 
 
Partial outsourcing index  
 
3.  This index was calculated in the same manner as the previous one, but for the 
tasks which were partially outsourced, i.e. it represents the share of partially 




“In house” index 
 
This index was calculated in the same manner as the previous two, only it represents the 
share of activities done exclusively “in house” (codes 1, 2 and 6 in question 14). (the new 
variable in the database is “indexalone”) 
                                                 






Annex 3: Imputation procedure for Turnover 
 
The survey sample of formal business in South Africa was derived using SARS 
information on firms’ reported turnover in 2005.  These turnover numbers were provided 
in the form of turnover bands (i.e., under R70 thousand, R70 to R300 thousand, and so on 
in the same fashion as being used in the analysis presented in this paper). In order to 
estimate turnover values for businesses that refused to provide such information to 
interviewers we used the following OLS model. 
 
For the test we used the following OLS model: 
 
e D Emp Turn turover time full     ) ln( ) ln( , where: 
 
ln(Turnfull-time) – ln total turnover, 
ln(Empfull-time) – ln fill-time employment, 
Dturnover – dummy variables for turnover bands, including DK/Refusal/Unsure. 
 
The results are shown in the tables below.   
 
Table A4.1: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variable: LN turnover (q55))  
 
Coeff. (unstand.) Std. Error  Signif. 
(Constant)  10.682  0.126  *** 
LN full-time employees  0.147  0.023  *** 
70K to 300K  1.291  0.138  *** 
300K to 1,000K  2.547  0.135  *** 
1,000K to 6,000K  3.894  0.133  *** 
6,000K to 14,000K  4.947  0.147  *** 
over 14,000K  5.970  0.158  *** 
DK/Unsure/Refusal  2.961  0.311  *** 
Adj. R2  0.873  
N  734  
Mean of the dependent variable  14.442  
 
Table A4.2: Residuals statistics 
 
  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  N 
Predicted Value  10.682  17.637  14.442  1.672  734 
Residual  -4.594  4.377  0.000  0.635  734 
Std. Predicted Value  -2.248  1.911  0.000  1.000  734 




Based on the high explanatory power of the model above we decided to use predicted 
turnover values for imputation.  Predictions were used only to replace missing turnover 
values for respondents who refused to provide exact volumes of turnover in rand (247 
respondents).  Missing values for respondents who stated that they do not know turnover 




Annex 4: Sensitivity analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis: Basic model     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.672  0.288  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.144  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.208  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.175  0.087  4.4% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.551  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.261     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.990     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.599  0.288  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.145  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.208  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.120  0.087  16.5% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.578  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.259     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.940     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.520  0.287  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.145  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.209  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.061  0.086  48.2% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.608  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.257     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.886     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.435  0.287  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.146  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.209  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.004  0.086  96.3% 




      
Adj. R2  0.256     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.828     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.342  0.287  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.146  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.209  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.075  0.086  38.4% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.679  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.256     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.766     
      
Dependent Variable: LN of total cost of tax compliance     
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.240  0.287  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.147  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.210  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.154  0.086  7.5% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.721  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.256     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.699     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 6.126  0.287  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.148  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.211  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.242  0.086  0.5% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.770  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.258     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.626     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 5.999  0.288  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.148  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.212  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.342  0.087  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.827  0.105  0.0% 




Adj. R2  0.261     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.545     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 5.854  0.289  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.149  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.213  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.457  0.087  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.895  0.105  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.267     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.455     
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 5.686  0.291  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.150  0.029  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.214  0.022  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.592  0.087  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.977  0.106  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.276     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.353     
      
      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
(Constant) 5.487  0.293  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.151  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.216  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.755  0.088  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  1.080  0.107  0.0% 
      
Adj. R2  0.289     
Mean of the dependent variable  9.237     
 
 
Sensitivity analysis: Base model     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+50% across the board) 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 7.042  0.298  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.126  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.164  0.023  0.0% 




Share of activities partially outsourced  0.510  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.174  0.067  0.9% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.164  0.078  3.7% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.312  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.142  0.072  4.8% 
Manufacturing -0.197  0.089  2.7% 
VAT 0.180  0.114  11.4% 
PAYE 0.292  0.099  0.3% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.298   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.990     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+40% across the board) 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.971  0.298  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.127  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.164  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.081  0.086  34.8% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.537  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.176  0.067  0.8% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.161  0.078  4.0% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.314  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.145  0.072  4.4% 
Manufacturing -0.195  0.089  2.8% 
VAT 0.183  0.114  10.8% 
PAYE 0.290  0.099  0.4% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.296   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.940     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+30% across the board) 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.895  0.297  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.127  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.164  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.021  0.086  80.9% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.567  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.177  0.067  0.8% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.159  0.078  4.3% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.315  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.148  0.072  3.9% 
Manufacturing -0.193  0.089  3.0% 
VAT 0.187  0.114  10.1% 
PAYE 0.287  0.099  0.4% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.295   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.886     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+20% across the board) 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 




LN full-time employees  0.127  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.164  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.045  0.086  60.4% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.600  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.179  0.066  0.7% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.156  0.078  4.7% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.317  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.151  0.072  3.5% 
Manufacturing -0.191  0.089  3.1% 
VAT 0.190  0.114  9.5% 
PAYE 0.283  0.099  0.4% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.294   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.828     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+10% across the board) 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.721  0.297  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.128  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.165  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.117  0.086  17.6% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.638  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.180  0.066  0.7% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.153  0.078  5.0% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.319  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.155  0.072  3.1% 
Manufacturing -0.189  0.089  3.3% 
VAT 0.194  0.114  8.8% 
PAYE 0.280  0.099  0.5% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.293   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.766     
    
Dependent Variable: LN of total cost of tax compliance       
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.621  0.297  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.128  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.165  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.196  0.086  2.3% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.681  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.182  0.066  0.6% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.151  0.078  5.4% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.321  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.158  0.072  2.8% 
Manufacturing -0.187  0.089  3.6% 
VAT 0.199  0.114  8.1% 
PAYE 0.275  0.099  0.6% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.294   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.699     




    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.510  0.297  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.128  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.166  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.285  0.086  0.1% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.730  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.183  0.067  0.6% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.148  0.078  5.8% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.323  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.162  0.072  2.4% 
Manufacturing -0.184  0.089  3.8% 
VAT 0.204  0.114  7.4% 
PAYE 0.271  0.099  0.6% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.295   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.626     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.386  0.298  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.128  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.166  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.386  0.086  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.787  0.103  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.185  0.067  0.6% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.146  0.078  6.3% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.326  0.094  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.166  0.072  2.1% 
Manufacturing -0.181  0.089  4.2% 
VAT 0.210  0.114  6.6% 
PAYE 0.265  0.099  0.8% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.298   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.545     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.245  0.299  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.129  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.167  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.502  0.087  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.855  0.104  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.187  0.067  0.5% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.144  0.079  6.8% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.329  0.095  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.171  0.072  1.8% 




VAT 0.217  0.115  5.9% 
PAYE 0.259  0.100  1.0% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.304   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.455     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 6.082  0.301  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.129  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.169  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.637  0.087  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  0.937  0.104  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.189  0.067  0.5% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.142  0.079  7.3% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.333  0.095  0.1% 
close corporation dummy  -0.175  0.073  1.6% 
Manufacturing -0.175  0.090  5.1% 
VAT 0.224  0.115  5.2% 
PAYE 0.251  0.100  1.3% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.312   
Mean of the dependent variable  9.353     
    
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig. 
(Constant) 5.888  0.304  0.0% 
LN full-time employees  0.130  0.030  0.0% 
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")  0.170  0.023  0.0% 
Share of activities completely outsourced  0.801  0.088  0.0% 
Share of activities partially outsourced  1.040  0.105  0.0% 
Guateng provincial dummy  0.190  0.068  0.5% 
Western Cape provincial dummy  -0.142  0.080  7.7% 
sole proprietor dummy  -0.337  0.096  0.0% 
close corporation dummy  -0.180  0.073  1.4% 
Manufacturing -0.172  0.091  5.9% 
VAT 0.234  0.116  4.5% 
PAYE 0.242  0.101  1.7% 
    
Adj.  R2  0.324   












Sensitivity analysis: Restricted model     
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.575  0.370  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.082  0.036  2.4%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.190 0.028 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -1.133  0.133  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.344  0.129  0.8%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.152  0.077  4.9%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.028  0.100  78.2%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.511  0.118  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.167  0.089  6.2%   
Manufacturing -0.206  0.107  5.4%   
VAT 0.200  0.123  10.4%   
PAYE 0.253  0.104  1.5%   
     
Adj. R2  0.465       
Mean of the dependent variable  10.059       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.510  0.368  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.082  0.036  2.2%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.190 0.028 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -1.084  0.132  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.323  0.128  1.2%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.155  0.077  4.4%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.034  0.099  73.1%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.514  0.117  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.173  0.089  5.2%   
Manufacturing -0.203  0.106  5.7%   
VAT 0.203  0.122  9.7%   
PAYE 0.250  0.103  1.6%   
     
Adj. R2  0.462       
Mean of the dependent variable  10.024       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.440  0.366  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.083  0.036  2.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.190 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -1.032  0.132  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.300  0.128  1.9%   




Western Cape provincial dummy  0.041  0.099  67.9%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.518  0.117  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.179  0.088  4.2%   
Manufacturing -0.200  0.106  6.0%   
VAT 0.207  0.121  8.9%   
PAYE 0.247  0.103  1.6%   
     
Adj. R2  0.459       
Mean of the dependent variable  9.987       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.367  0.364  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.084  0.036  1.9%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.191 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.977  0.131  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.276  0.127  3.0%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.161  0.076  3.5%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.048  0.099  62.4%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.522  0.116  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.186  0.088  3.4%   
Manufacturing -0.197  0.105  6.3%   
VAT 0.211  0.121  8.1%   
PAYE 0.244  0.102  1.7%   
     
Adj. R2  0.456       
Mean of the dependent variable  9.948       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.287  0.363  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.085  0.035  1.7%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.191 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.918  0.130  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.250  0.127  4.9%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.164  0.076  3.1%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.056  0.098  56.8%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.526  0.116  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.194  0.087  2.7%   
Manufacturing -0.193  0.105  6.7%   
VAT 0.216  0.120  7.4%   
PAYE 0.240  0.102  1.9%   
     
Adj. R2  0.452       








Dependent Variable: LN of total cost of tax compliance         
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.202  0.362  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.086  0.035  1.6%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.191 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.855  0.130  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.222  0.126  7.9%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.167  0.075  2.7%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.064  0.098  51.0%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.531  0.116  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.202  0.087  2.1%   
Manufacturing -0.189  0.105  7.1%   
VAT 0.220  0.120  6.7%   
PAYE 0.236  0.101  2.0%   
     
Adj. R2  0.448       
Mean of the dependent variable  9.864       
     
     
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.110  0.361  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.086  0.035  1.5%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.192 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.787  0.130  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.192  0.126  12.8%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.170  0.075  2.4%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.073  0.098  45.3%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.537  0.115  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.211  0.087  1.6%   
Manufacturing -0.185  0.104  7.7%   
VAT 0.226  0.120  6.0%   
PAYE 0.232  0.101  2.2%   
     
Adj. R2  0.444       
Mean of the dependent variable  9.818       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 7.009  0.360  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.087  0.035  1.4%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.192 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.714  0.130  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.159  0.126  20.7%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.174  0.075  2.1%   




sole proprietor dummy  -0.543  0.115  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.220  0.087  1.1%   
Manufacturing -0.181  0.104  8.4%   
VAT 0.232  0.120  5.3%   
PAYE 0.227  0.101  2.5%   
     
Adj. R2  0.438       
Mean of the dependent variable  7.768       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.898  0.361  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.088  0.035  1.3%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.193 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.634  0.130  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.123  0.126  33.1%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.178  0.075  1.8%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.093  0.098  33.8%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.550  0.115  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.231  0.087  0.8%   
Manufacturing -0.176  0.104  9.3%   
VAT 0.239  0.120  4.7%   
PAYE 0.222  0.101  2.9%   
     
Adj. R2  0.432       
Mean of the dependent variable  9.714       
     
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.774  0.362  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.089  0.035  1.3%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.194 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.546  0.130  0.0%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.082  0.126  51.8%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.182  0.075  1.6%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.105  0.098  28.4%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.558  0.116  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.243  0.087  0.6%   
Manufacturing -0.171  0.105  10.3%   
VAT 0.246  0.120  4.1%   
PAYE 0.216  0.101  3.4%   
     
Adj. R2  0.424       








Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.634  0.364  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.089  0.036  1.3%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.196 0.027 0.0%   
Share of activities completely outsourced  -0.447  0.131  0.1%   
Share of activities partially outsourced  -0.036  0.127  78.0%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.186  0.076  1.5%   
Western Cape provincial dummy  0.117  0.099  23.4%   
sole proprietor dummy  -0.568  0.116  0.0%   
close corporation dummy  -0.256  0.088  0.4%   
Manufacturing -0.165  0.105  11.8%   
VAT 0.255  0.121  3.5%   
PAYE 0.209  0.102  4.1%   
     
Adj. R2  0.415       
Mean of the dependent variable  9.591       
 
 
Sensitivity analysis: Polarized model     
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.861  0.379  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.172  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.141 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.571  0.106  0.0%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.361  0.087  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.238  0.119  4.6%   
PAYE 0.544  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.320    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.749       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.792  0.378  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.172  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.142 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.506  0.106  0.0%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.362  0.087  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.238  0.119  4.6%   
PAYE 0.543  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.311    




      
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.718  0.378  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.171  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.142 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.436  0.106  0.0%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.363  0.087  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.239  0.119  4.5%   
PAYE 0.542  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.302    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.633       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.638  0.378  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.171  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.142 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.360  0.106  0.1%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.364  0.087  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.240  0.119  4.5%   
PAYE 0.540  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.293    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.568       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.550  0.378  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.171  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.142 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.277  0.106  0.9%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.365  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.240  0.119  4.4%   
PAYE 0.539  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.285    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.498       
     
Dependent Variable: LN of total cost of tax compliance         
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.455  0.377  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.171  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 




dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.186  0.106  7.9%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.366  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.241  0.119  4.3%   
PAYE 0.537  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.276    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.421       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-10% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.348  0.377  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.170  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.143 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  -0.086  0.106  41.7%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.367  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.241  0.119  4.3%   
PAYE 0.536  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.268    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.335       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-20% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.230  0.377  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.170  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.143 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  0.027  0.106  80.2%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.368  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.242  0.119  4.2%   
PAYE 0.534  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.262    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.240       
     
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-30% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 6.095  0.377  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.169  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.143 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  0.154  0.106  14.5%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.370  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.243  0.119  4.1%   
PAYE 0.531  0.140  0.0%   
     




Mean of the dependent variable  9.132       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-40% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 5.939  0.377  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.169  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.144 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  0.302  0.106  0.4%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.372  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.243  0.119  4.1%   
PAYE 0.529  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.256    
Mean of the dependent variable  9.007       
     
Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (-50% across the 
board) 
 
 Coeff. Std.  Error  Sig.   
(Constant) 5.754  0.377  0.0%   
LN full-time employees  0.168  0.039  0.0%   
LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no 
answer") 
0.144 0.030 0.0%   
dummy for full in-house (0) and full outsourcing  0.477  0.106  0.0%   
Guateng provincial dummy  0.374  0.086  0.0%   
Manufacturing -0.244  0.119  4.0%   
PAYE 0.525  0.140  0.0%   
     
Adj.  R2  0.260    
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